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For those seeking more than a basic education, this work provides a serious
guide to today’s “hottest” adversaries
and their weapons of mass destruction.
Through well researched history, biography, and analysis of the cultural and
strategic setting, this book acquaints
readers with today’s enemies and invites
them to ponder critically the propensity
of these enemies to use their weapons.

image management can disguise. Direct
microanalysis at the level of structure of
a leader’s videotaped expression offers
insights into psychological states and
cognitive patterns, cues into how these
contextually unfold over time, and
topic-yielding insights into stress, credibility, level of certitude, and conflict
that can still remain undetected after
years of traditional analysis.

A curious omission of this research is
its lack of any systematic methodological discussion. The book’s primary assumption is that deterring adversaries
requires an understanding of their strategic culture. Yet nowhere do the editors formally define strategic culture
or its link to the adversary. The reader
comes to appreciate, however, that each
study uniquely attempts to make the
connection.

Challenging the way policy makers and
analysts think about this vacuum in
understanding weapons of mass destruction and foreign adversaries is the
problem that this book illuminates, and
it is perhaps ultimately its most significant contribution.

Between the lines, this study calls for a
new paradigm, yet the book itself
mostly relies on an outdated theoretical
approach that ultimately handicaps
what it set out to do—assess adversaries.
That kind of work requires a deeper analytic template for profile analysis than
presently conceived, one that cannot be
wedged into political science paradigms.
Ultimately, knowing the enemy requires a better appreciation of the advanced capabilities that studies of such
behavioral areas as emotion, cognition,
and performance can offer. Alongside
traditional political science and psychology, this brings a deeper understanding to the urgent and complex
problem of knowing our adversaries in
relation to deterrence, information
warfare, and psychological operations.
An adversary’s behavioral structure reflects his identity and a consistency of
pattern and style that no amount of
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Keegan, John. Intelligence in War: Knowledge of
the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda. New York:
Knopf, 2003. 387pp. $30

Among many military historians, the
release of a book by John Keegan is
cause for celebration, and the sentiment
is not altogether out of place. Keegan’s
prolific output of insightful studies,
reaching back to his seminal Face of
Battle (1992), has won for himself devotees from both the academic and public
sectors. In his latest book, Intelligence in
War, Keegan returns to the distinctive
format he used in The Face of Battle,
dividing his study into several vignettes
from a broad range of military history—what he labels here as “a collection of case studies”—organized, in this
case, to highlight the effect that good
intelligence has on military operations,
and the general role intelligence plays
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in underpinning the effectiveness of
armed forces in the field.
Beginning with Admiral Horatio Nelson’s
chase of the French Mediterranean fleet
in 1798, Keegan goes on to discuss the
role of intelligence in Stonewall Jackson’s
Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862,
the British navy’s search for Rear Admiral Maximilian von Spee and his ships
in World War I, and the battle of Midway, the German assault on Crete, and
the Battle of the Atlantic in World War
II. In each of these, we see how the
gathering and the use of intelligence—
two very different acts—affected the action. As usual, Keegan’s narrative skill
sets the stage succinctly for his discussion. We feel how heavily the unknown
weighs on the commanders, Nelson especially, and how at times they were
bogged down sorting through an overabundance of intelligence, especially
after the advent of wireless communication, to divine the plans of the enemy.
Commanders had to deal with many
possible answers to difficult questions,
usually with only one being the right
answer. Intelligence, we realize, works
to weed out possibilities and narrow
the options.
A book-length study of how crucial intelligence is will almost inevitably run
the risk of elevating this one element
above all other elements in a successful
military operation. “If only this commander had known about the enemy’s
troops,” we might find ourselves saying,
or, “If only his spies would have alerted
the admiral to his opponent’s plans the
outcome here would surely have been
different.” To his credit, however,
Keegan avoids this determinism that
would cause us to think that with good
intelligence, battlefield victories can be
made all but certain. On the contrary,
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he acknowledges that “however good
the intelligence available before an encounter may appear to be . . . the outcome will still be decided by the fight.”
Brutal fighting, we are reminded, along
with a good bit of luck, are the key determinants of battlefield success. What
Keegan instead shows is that good intelligence can reduce the scope of the unknown, and most importantly remove
guesswork from the equation as much
as possible. “Thought,” Keegan explains, “offers a means of reducing the
price” of the cold, bloody attrition that
lurks in the background of all battlefield victories.
Unlike some other Keegan volumes,
this work builds its effectiveness only
cumulatively through its stories. If one
picks up this book and reads but one or
two of the vignettes, a clear and timeless axiom of intelligence is likely to
elude him. It is through the cumulative
effect of all these stories, one after the
other, that we begin to grasp Keegan’s
broader point and see just how varied
in form and content, but fundamentally
useful, sound intelligence of every sort
can be. One clear contribution that this
book makes is to remind us that intelligence has much to do with mundane
issues of how dense that forest on the
map really is, how muddy that road
becomes in April, or how to interpret
what we inadvertently overhear on the
radio.
Professional military readers will understand intuitively the importance of
intelligence in the new kind of war the
United States finds itself fighting today,
and that brings us to the book’s subtitle. Given the recent debates over the
quality of American intelligence, many
readers will eagerly anticipate that
Keegan’s analysis of the war against
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al-Qa‘ida and that the war on terror will
be as fully developed as his examination of
Jackson’s Valley campaign or the battle
of Midway. Those readers will be disappointed. The discussion of al-Qa‘ida is
only a small part of his penultimate
chapter, “Military Intelligence since
1945,” which discusses the Falklands
War in greater length than what the
United States faces today. Nevertheless,
Keegan speculates that old-fashioned
human intelligence will be the best
means of carrying the war to the new
enemies of the United States, and
through his historical exposition of intelligence, we are well reminded just
how crucial this apparently mundane
work really is.
DAVID A. SMITH

Baylor University

Reeve, John, and David Stevens, eds. The Face of
Naval Battle: The Human Experience of Modern
War at Sea. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and
Unwin, 2003. 363pp. $24.95

An author who uses the words “the face
of battle” in the title of any book pertaining to military matters is throwing
down a pretty hefty literary gauntlet.
For “face of battle” guarantees that the
work in question will be compared to
Keegan’s 1976 landmark volume of the
same name. Keegan asked the basic
question, “What is it like to be in a battle?” He sought the answer in a comparative study of the battles of Agincourt,
Waterloo, and the Somme.
John Reeve and David Stevens were well
aware their book would be compared to
The Face of Battle. In fact, they encourage the comparison and offer their
book as a sort of maritime bookend to
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Keegan’s earlier work. There is a patent
need for such a work and while some,
including Keegan himself, have tried to
fill it, none have yet succeeded. Despite a
most encouraging beginning, however,
Reeve and Stevens also miss the mark,
although this book is still worth reading.
Rather than a coherent examination of
the human experience of naval combat,
this work is a collection of essays by
seventeen separate authors, the majority of whom happen to be Australian.
This is not surprising when the reader
learns that most of the essays were originally presented at the 2001 King-Hall
Naval History Conference in Canberra.
The book starts off strongly with a masterful essay by John Reeve, who discusses naval history in general,
identifying certain challenges in “piercing the veil” of individuals’ experiences
in naval battle and suggesting an organizational approach, analogous to that
used by Keegan, that could be used to
grow a general understanding of naval
combat. Unfortunately, the use of
preexisting essays may have precluded
such an approach, and the promise of
the first chapter is not met in the book’s
subsequent pages.
The essays are arranged more or less in
chronological order and cover such diverse topics as a look at the battle of the
Yellow Sea, the treatment of German
sailors taken prisoner in World War I,
and the personal experiences of an officer in command of an Australian
guided missile destroyer in Operation
DESERT STORM.
Despite its failure to live up to the
promise of its title, this work is worth
reading for several reasons. First, much
of it, especially the portion written by
Russell Parkin, deals with the
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